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Recent Cases
dangerous conditions, she may have
contributed to her injury. Under
Washington's comparative negligence
law, this type of risk assumption could
reduce recovery but could not bar it
completely. The court also considered
Washington's ski statute, WASH. REV.
CODE § 70.117, which imposed duties
both on skiers and on ski operators, but
which did not relieve operators from
liability for their negligence.
Accordingly, the court noted that
under Washington law, the Ski Resort
had a duty to warn skiers of any dangerous condition unless that condition was
so obvious as to be inescapably noticeable. At trial there was some dispute
between the parties regarding the towshack's position in relation to the race
course. The Ski Resort claimed that the
shack was an obvious danger, and that
therefore, the Ski Resort had no duty to
warn Justin. The Scotts, on the other
hand, asserted that the shack was not an
obvious hazard and that it posed an
unanticipated danger and an unknown
risk to Justin. Noting that primary
implied assumption of risk in a sports
context does not release the operator
from the duty to provide reasonably
safe facilities, the court held that ajury
must decide the extent of the Ski
Resort's responsibility for the accident.
The court also found that Justin's
awareness of the risks inherent in the
sport of skiing did not automatically
make him liable for any failure by the
Ski Resort to provide safe facilities.
Rather, Justin may have been contributorily negligent by knowingly participating in a race on such a hazardous
course. Such contributory negligence,
the court noted, would not preclude his
recovery in a negligence action against
the Ski Resort, but instead would reduce any damages he might recover.
Accordingly, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the Ski Resort, and
returned the case to the trial court in
order to allow a jury to decide Justin's

claims against the Ski Resort. le
Laura M. Zubor

Residential Re-Roofing
Contract is a Consumer
Product Covered by the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act
In Muchisky v. Frederic Roofing,
Co., 1992 WL 182300 (Mo. App.,
Aug. 4, 1992), the Missouri Court of
Appeals held that the re-roofing of a
home under a written contract, which
provided a warranty for the workmanship and materials, is a consumer product within the meaning of the
Magnuson-Moss Act ("Act"), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2301. Furthermore, the court distinguished between fixtures added to an
existing structure and fixtures incorporated in the creation of the structure,
characterizing only the former as consumer products within the statutory
definition.
Continuous Problems with the Roof
Thomas P. Muchisky ("Muchisky")
contracted with Frederic Roofing Co.,
Inc. ("Frederic") to re-roof his home.
The contract contained a twelve year,
defect-free warranty on the completed
roof, which guaranteed workmanship
as well as materials. Frederic re-roofed
the house on March 21, 1988. Subsequently, Muchisky called the contractor twice to make remedial repairs to
the new roof. On August 16, 1988,
Muchisky notified Frederic of his continued dissatisfaction with the roof and
terminated Frederic's services, after he
paid only $4,000 of the $8,272 contract
price.
Muchisky then filed suit against
Frederic, alleging breach of contract,
breach of warranty, and violation of
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act for

breach of written warranty. Frederic
counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract for the homeowner's failure to
pay the contract price. The jury found
in favor of Muchisky and awarded him
damages of $10,000 and $11,200 in
attorney's fees. Frederic then appealed
to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
On appeal, Frederic asserted that the
trial court erred in denying his motion
for ajudgment as a matter of law for the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act count.
Frederic further contended that the Act
did not apply to service contracts, such
as the re-roofing contract with
Muchisky, but applied only to sales
contracts.
Statutory Language and Federal
Trade Commission Regulations Not
Dispositive
The appellate court found that the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act defined
consumer product as "any tangible personal property which is distributed in
commerce and which is normally used
for personal, family or household purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or installed in
any real property without regard to
whether it is so attached or installed)."
The appellate court also noted that
House Reports indicated congressional
intent to apply the statute to such real
estate fixtures as hot water heaters and
air conditioners, irrespective of their
common law classification as realty.
The court also found that the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), the
agency charged with administration of
the Act, looked to the nature of the
transaction when defining a fixture as a
consumer product.
Additionally, the court relied upon
16 C.F.R. § 700.1 (f), which interpreted
the Act. This section states that when a
consumer contracts for the construction of a home or substantial addition to
an existing home, the parties are deemed
to contract for construction of the integrated structure even though the materials are separately identifiable upon
formation of the contract. This secLoyola Consumer Law Reporter
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tion, the court stated, would render the
Act inapplicable in this case.
CongressionalIntent: Addition or
Creation?
The Missouri Court of Appeals reasoned that Congress apparently intended
the Act to protect some personal property that traditionally becomes part of
real estate. The court also noted that
the FTC regulations indicated that Congress intended the sale of real estate to
be excluded from the Act's protection.
However, the court acknowledged that
neither the statute nor the regulations
clearly addressed whether the residential re-roofing contract at bar should
have been protected by the Act.
The court relied on 16 C.F.R.
§ 700.1(e), which specified the types
of personal property affixed to real
property that were intended to be protected by the Act. The court noted that
if the consumer contracts for the purchase of materials for the improvement, repair, or renovation of a home,
then the materials are consumer products within the scope of the definition.
However, if the materials are already
integrated into the structure of the residence at the time of sale, they are not
distinguishable from realty and thus
not protected under the Act.
The court of appeals determined
that the distinguishing factor between
fixtures that are consumer products and
fixtures that become part of real estate
was the time at which the fixture was
integrated into the structure of the home:
during construction, or after construction. Additionally, the court interpreted the time of sale in 16 C.F.R.
§ 700.1 subsection (e) to mean the time
at which a binding contract had been
formed. If the language meant at the
time the product was supplied and payment was due, the court stated that a
consumer would never have a legal
basis under the Act for home improvements. The court also relied upon 16
C.F.R. § 700.1(a) of the Act, which
instructs courts to resolve questions of
product coverage in favor of coverage.
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Based on the above interpretation, the
Missouri Court of Appeals concluded
that the re-roofing was a consumer
product within the definition of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
DissentArgued that the Materials
were Realty
The dissent stated that the roofing
materials were the personal property of
the contractor prior to their integration
into the home, and when the homeowner
owned the materials, they had become
an integral part of the residence. Thus,
the dissent concluded that the materials
were realty under traditional property
law principles which rendered the Act
inapplicable.
The dissent also argued that the
majority ignored the FTC's interpretation in 16 C.F.R. § 700.1(e), which
indicated that the nature of the sale
should be the basis of the analysis. The
dissent further cited the language of 16
C.F.R. § 700.1(e) of the Act, which
stated that the nature of the transaction
must be analyzed, not the nature of the
real estate. Accordingly, the dissent
stated that the question was whether the
contract was to purchase goods and
services or whether the contract was to
purchase the completed project. The
dissent noted that when homeowners
such as Muchisky contracts for the
completed project, including goods and
services, he did not receive consideration until all of the personal property
was attached to the real estate. Therefore, the dissent concluded that
Muchisky never owned or purchased
such consumer goods in order to bring
his claim within the purview of the Act.
Furthermore, the dissent found the
stated purpose of the Act inapplicable
to the circumstances of this case. The
purpose of the Act was to supplement
state law for the protection of consumers against deceptive warranties. The
dissent found that existing state law
already protected the homeowner in
the instant case and therefore precluded
the use of the Act. o.*o
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Moving Made Safe
and Secure
For almost anyone, moving is a
real hassle. But a helpful
pamphlet available from the
Interstate Commerce
Commission can ease some
concerns.
To obtain
"Your Rights and
Responsibilities When You
Move," call
(215) 596-4040 in the East
(312) 353-6204 in the Midwest
(415) 744-6520 in the West

Safe Eating
A comprehensive report,
"Mercury Warning: The Fish
You Catch May Be Unsafe to
Eat," surveys the state of

knowledge about mercury
pollution.
Copies of the report are $20
each for individuals or
nonprof its, and $100 each for
industries or corporations.
The report is available from:
Clean Water Action Project
132018th St., NW.
Washington, D.C. 20036-1811
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